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A Near-Optimal Method for Reasoning about Action* 
VAUGHAN R. PRATT 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 
We give an algorithm for “before-after” reasoning about action. The algorithm decides 
satisfiability and validity of formulas of propositional dynamic logic, a recently developed 
logic of change of state that subsumes the zero-order component of most other action- 
oriented logics. The algorithm requires time at most proportional to an exponentially 
growing function of the length (number of occurrences of variables and connectives) of 
the input. Fischer and Ladner have shown that that every algorithm for this problem 
must take exponential time, making this algorithm optimal to within a polynomial. 
Application areas include program verification, program synthesis, and discourse analysis. 
The algorithm is based on the method of semantic tableaux, appropriately generalized to 
dynamic logic. A formal treatment of the generalization, called Hintikha structures, is 
developed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Dynamic Logic 
Almost all existing logics of imperative programs contain implicitly or explicitly the 
construct “after(a, p)” which asserts that after action a halts, program p holds. They 
also almost all cater for programming constructs to do with assignment, testing, sequencing, 
choice and iteration, and logical constructs to do with truth functions and quantification. 
Dynamic logic [18] consists of (i) a language in which such constructs appear explicitly, 
and (ii) a formal semantics for that language. 
Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) was defined by Fischer and Ladner [6j as the natural 
restriction of first-order dynamic logic to the term-free case (therefore no assignments, 
quantifiers or non-zeroary predicates). This restriction is of interest in that it gives a 
convenient way of studying the term-independent part of reasoning with formulas and 
actions (programs). Propositional variables (as with any variables) can be viewed as 
expressions whose internal structure is of no concern in the reasoning at hand. Thus the 
techniques we develop here apply to more general reasoning about action in the same way 
that propositional calculus techniques apply to more general static reasoning about 
specific domains. 
* This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under NSF grant nos. 
MCS76-18461 and MCS78-04338. This paper is a revision of “A Practical Decision Method for 
Propositional Dynamic Logic,” presented at the 10th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of 
Computing, San Diego, May 1978. The revision incorporates a substantially more efficient method. 
The material on process logic and axiom systems in the symposium paper has been omitted and 
will appear elsewhere. 
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The language of PDL is a set of expressions divided into formulas and actions. Letting 
a, b, c,... range over actions and p, q, I,... over formulas, we many enumerate the ex- 
pressions of PDL as follows. 
The set @ of formulas: 
Atomic formulas: P, Q, R,... 
Composite formulas: -p, (a@ 
The set 2 of actions: 
Atomic actions: A, B, C,... 
Composite actions: a U b, a ; b, a*, p ? 
P, Q, R... are the usual propositional or formula variables, ranging over truth values, 
and N is logical negation. (We obtain all other logical connectives as abbreviations, 
starting with p A q for (p ?)q.) (a)p is our notation for “a can ensure p.” To be more 
precise, (u)p is true of state u just when p is true of one of the states a can terminate in 
when started in u. (The need to deal with more than one state in such a definition is 
what makes this a dynamic logic, as opposed to say the more static propositional calculus, 
where -p is true of u just when p is not true of the same state u.) 
A, B, C,... are action variables, analogous to formula variables. They may range over 
nondeterministic actions in general. a u b is the choice of u or b. a; b is the sequence 
a followed by b. a* is the iteration of a an indefinite but finite number of times. p? is 
the test of p, an action whose execution is permitted just when p holds. These concepts 
are made more precise by the semantics given in Section 2. 
Typical assertions possible in dynamic logic are (a U b)p (one of a or b can ensure p, 
equivalent to (u)p v (b)p), (a*)~ ( a can eventually ensure p), (u)(b)p (u can ensure 
that b can ensure that p, equivalent to (a; b)p), and -(a)~ (p is guaranteed to be false 
after executing a, i.e., a cannot attain any state satisfying p). 
Definability. Dynamic logic subsumes a number of other logics by offering definitions 
for their constructs, and we shall take advantage of this throughout the paper. Using 
this ability we treat p A q as an abbreviation for (p ?)q, F as an abbreviation for P A -P, 
T as -F, p r> q as -(p A wq), and similarly for v and =. Definable programming 
concepts include ifp then a else b, as (p ?; u) u (-p ?; b), and while p do a, as (p ?; a)*; 
-p ?. We define [alp as ~(a) -p; [u] is the dual of (a) in the same sense that VX 
is the dual of 3x. Definable program correctness constructs include Hoare’s [ll] partial 
correctness construct p(a}q, definable asp 3 [u]q, and Basu and Yeh’s [l] total correctness 
construct p[u]q for deterministic programs, as p 3 (u)q. Dijkstra’s total correctness 
construct wp(u, p) for nondeterministic programs [5] is definable as [a]$ A (u)T A -na 
where flu asserts that a has a diverging computation. For deterministic programs na 
is definable in DL as [u]F but for the more general case of nondeterministic programs nu 
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is not definable in propositional DL. However Meyer and Winklmann [15, 251 have shown 
that it is definable in first-order DL. 
Theorems. Some formulas are always true, or valid. They include p v -p; (a U b)p s 
(a)p v (b)p as we saw above along with {a; b)p = (a)(b)p; [a](p 3 q) A [alp 3 [u]q (a sort 
of “delayed ModusPonens”); (a)@ v 4) = <a)p v (a)q; (a)@ A 4) 3 (a)p A (u)a (but 
not the converse); <a*)p = p v (u)(u*)p (d ecomposition of a* into zero and non-zero 
number of iterations); ((a; b)*; u)p = (a; (b; a)*)p; and p A [a*]@ 3 [alp) 1 [u*]p 
(analogous to mathematical induction). One would expect such obviously valid formulas 
to be among the theorems of any practical axiom system for DL, and to be efficiently 
identifiable as valid by any practical decision method for validity. 
Rules. We may also observe that if p and p 3 Q are valid then so is 4 (corresponding 
to the rule of Modus Ponens), and if p is valid then so is [u]p for any a (the rule of 
Necessitation from modal logic). Any rule whose conclusion is valid when its premises 
are valid is called sound. Other rules include: from p 3 p’ and p’{u}n infer p(u}q; from 
p{u> 4’ and 4’ 3 4 infer p{u}q; from p(u}q and q(b) Y infer p(u; b}r; from p A r{b)q and 
p A -r(b}q infer p(if Y then a else b}q; and from p A q(u}p infer p{whiZe q do u}p A -q 
(Hoare’s rules[ll]). 0 ne would expect such obviously sound rules to be derivable in 
any practical axiom system for DL. 
Example. The following gives a simple example of the sort of problem PDL is useful 
for. Consider the two programs “while P do (A; A),’ and “while P do A”. (We assume 
that testing P has no side-effects, that is, does not cause a change of state.) It is the case 
that if the first program can reach a final state when started in a given state, so can the 
second. This is true even if A is nondeterministic. (When A is deterministic, “can reach 
a final state” means “is guaranteed to halt,” or “terminates.“) 
This valid statement about the relationship between the termination of the respective 
programs can be easily stated in PDL, as (while P do (A; A))T 3 (while P do A)T, or 
-(((P?; A; A)*; NP?) N(P?) -P?)N ((P?; A)*; NP?) N (P?) - P if we were 
to expand out all our abbreviations (which we obviously wouldn’t want to have to do in 
actual applications). Hence it serves as a simple representative of a class of problems for 
decision which a method exists. 
Outline 
The main contribution of this paper is a deterministic exponential time algorithm for 
deciding satisfiability in PDL. 
Fischer and Ladner [6, 71 showed how a nondeterministic Turing machine could 
accept satisfiable PDL formulas of length n within a number of steps proportional to c” 
for some c, a nondeterministic exponential upper bound, and proved that there did not exist 
a deterministic Turing machine that could always decide whether an arbitrary PDL 
formula of length n was satisfiable in fewer than dn steps for some d > 1, a deterministic 
exponential lower bound. The upper bound was obtained by using the equivalent for PDL 
of the method of truth tables, which enumerates all possible models of a given size and 
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evaluates the formula in each. With our present knowledge about nondeterministic 
computation the best deterministic upper bound derivable from their result is 2O” for 
some c. The lower bound was obtained by reducing the acceptance problem for 
linear-space-bounded alternating Turing machines to the decision problem for PDL 
satisfiability. 
Using the equivalent for PDL of the method of tableaux we give a deterministic expo- 
nential upper bound, meeting the lower bound to within a polynomial and giving a 
method with worst-case time within a polynomial of all of the thus-far-analyzed methods 
for satisfiability in ordinary propositional calculus. Our method could be viewed as 
showing how to reduce the satisfiability problem for PDL to the acceptance problem for 
linear-space-bounded alternating Turing machines. We shall not however so view it, 
since the algorithm is just as easy to describe without using alternating machines. The 
reader familiar with alternation will see the connection without any difficulty. 
The significance of our result will be felt first in the area of automatic program veri- 
fication, where the primary objective is to minimize the amount of detail the programmer 
must supply in a proof of correctness of a program that is to be certified mechanically. 
In fact our motivation for studying this problem was to find and apply such an algorithm 
to the program verification system we have been constructing at MIT during the past 
two years, Our experience was that the amount of detail required from the user in the 
area characterizable as the propositional dynamic logic component of the system was 
the greatest bottleneck in user productivity. Observing the work being done with other 
verification systems, particularly those of Wegbreit and of Oppen, convinced us that our 
problems were common to most and probably all program verification systems. The role 
of dynamic logic in this was to simplify the problem domain, making it easier for us to 
formulate and solve this particular problem. 
We hope that at some time the need for logics of action will be felt by the computational 
linguistics community, at which time our algorithm will find application there also. 
The result is of theoretical interest because of the scarcity of naturally occurring 
problems with such tight non-linear bounds. In fact the only previously known such 
problem is that of testing for circularity in Knuth-type attribute grammars, which was 
shown by Jazayeri, Ogden, and Rounds [12] to have a deterministic time lower bound 
of cn/lozn for some c > 1 and a deterministic time upper bound of d” for some d for 
grammars of length n bits. Even this gap, small as it is, is larger than any polynomial. 
Shortly after we discovered this result, H. Lewis established similarly tight bounds 
for the decision problems for two fragments of predicate calculus [14]. 
Our result is of further theoretical interest in that, like the Jazayeri et al result, the 
tight bounds can be proved easily via a correspondence with a family of automata that 
characterize deterministic exponential time. There are at present two such families: 
Cook’s family of linear-space auxiliary push-down automata [4], and the Chandra-Kozen- 
Stockmeyer family of linear-space alternating Turing machines (ATM’s) [3, 131. The 
Jazayeri et al result uses a correspondence with the former, our PDL result with the latter. 
The PDL lower bound is proved explicitly in [6] via a reductionfrom ATM’s, Our upper 
bound could be proved via a reduction to ATM’s, but a more direct proof is just as 
convenient. 
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Our decision method can be viewed as symbolic execution, an approach to program 
verification that has attracted interest in some circles in the past few years [16, 241. 
The connection will become apparent when the tableau method is described. 
Our application to PDL of the Hintikka set approach [lo, 22, 231 may be of interest 
to theoretical logicians. The applicability of the Hintikka set approach to binary relations 
is not immediately obvious until it is seen. We broaden the scope of applicability of the 
Hintikka approach with the help of the notion of a H&i&z StrUc&e, which has two 
functions and four predicates over a domain of theories. 
More recently [20] the author has developed an alternative decision method for PDL 
that is to the method of truth tables for propositional calculus as the method described 
here is to the method of tableaux for propositional calculus. 
The theory underlying our algorithm also contains the bulk of the material needed 
for a proof of completeness of the Segerberg axioms for PDL [21]. Such a proof, using 
a Gentzen type axiomatization as an obvious intermediate step, was sketched in [19]. 
(The observant reader of [19] may have noticed two errors in our axiomatization: the 
two P’s in the first rule should be lower case, and, as pointed out to us by M. Valiev, 
the first premise of our induction rule should read r -+ p, A, not r --+ p.) This application 
of the theory has been removed from this paper and will appear later as a separate paper. 
The existence of other proofs of the completeness result, particularly [17], which appears 
to be the first satisfactory such proof, has lessened for us the urgency of publication of 
yet another proof. (There also exists a sketch for a proof by D. Gabbay [8].) Furthermore, 
complexity results and completeness proofs tend to appeal to different audiences; this 
paper accordingly has focused on complexity to the exclusion of axiomatizations. 
Much of our theory is also applicable to our newly developed logic of processes, 
which also appeared in [19]. In the interests of factoring out our substantive novel 
contributions the process logic material, like the axiom system, has been transferred to 
a separate paper. 
2. HINTIKKA STRUCTURES 
In this section we develop a novel method for specifying the semantics of a logic. 
This semantic approach is mathematically attractive in its own right. However our 
primary purpose in developing it is to facilitate a more formal treatment of the tableau 
method. The tableau method for propositional calculus is sufficiently trivial that its 
formalization serves little or no purpose as an aid to understanding. For PDL however 
the tableau method is rather more involved, warranting a more formal treatment. 
We shall adopt the trick of letting the language itself supply the basis for defining a 
semantic model. This approach is not very effective for supplying the semantics of 
number theory or complex variable theory, but it works well for propositional calculus, 
predicate calculus, and as we shall see in the next section, PDL. 
Suppose for example that we wished to define the semantics of the propositional 
calculus, whose language we shall consider to be a set of formulas containing propositional 
variables and being closed under disjunction and negation. Intuitively we would want 
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a model to be an assignment of truth values to the variables of the language. Of course 
this assignment then forces the values of the remaining formulas of the language, via 
the standard interpretation of N and v. So we could take a model to be any assignment 
of truth values to all the statements of the language, subject in the case of propositional 
calculus to the constraints that p and -p be assigned different truth values, and 
p v q be assigned true just when at least one of p or q is assigned true. 
The formalization of this that we shall use here takes a model to be a set. The elements 
of the set are called statements, and are drawn from a larger set of statements called the 
semantic language. The role of statements is to define the model by asserting all of its 
properties. We let the variables s, t,... range over statements. 
For propositional calculus it suffices to use statements of the form “p is true” and “p is 
false,” which we can abbreviate to Tp and Fp. This is exactly the approach adopted by 
Smullyan [22] for propositional calculus. 
A model should have two properties. First, every statement should occur either 
positively or negatively (completeness), but not both (consistency). Second, the meanings 
of the formulas should be respected. Thus for propositional calculus T(p v q) should 
be in the model if and only if one of Tp or Tq is in the model. Moreover if F(p v q) 
is in the model then both Fp and Fq should be in it as well. And T - p should be in the 
model if and only if Tp is not in. 
There is a certain amount of redundancy with the signs and the negation symbol that 
makes this approach seem a little clumsy. The rules about consistency and completeness 
seem to say the same thing as the semantic condition on -. To eliminate this redundancy 
we shall modify Smullyan’s approach slightly by assuming that the double negation rule 
is incorporated into the syntax of any language we treat with this approach. That is, if 
the negation of -p is to be formed the outcome is p, not w--p. In this way we may 
assume that the formulas of the treated language come in pairs, each the negation of the 
other. 
In the case of propositional calculus this then means that the semantic statements can 
be taken to be the formulas themselves, letting the language’s negation operator serve 
double duty in determining truth and falsity. The rules that a model of propositional 
calculus has to meet then are that p is present if and only if -p is absent, and p v q is 
present if and only if p or q is present. 
We shall capture this sort of semantic information with the aid of a relational structure 
whose domain consists of theories x, y,... (sets of statements) and which has two unary 
operations: x and x6, and four unary relations: consistent(x), complete(x), Hintikka(x), 
and closed(x). The semantic information itself is coded in t-. We call such a structure 
a Hintikku structure. 
The theory x is always interpreted as the set of negations of elements of x. Since 
double negations cancel, we have E = x. We also have that if x = f then x partitions 
into disjoint blocks y, 7. Writing x’ for the set of statements not in x, we may read X’ 
as either the complement of the negations or the negations of the complement, without 
ambiguity. 
The interpretation of I- determines the semantics of the language. In the case of 
propositional calculus the theory XI- consists of the literals of x (so E- is literal-preserving), 
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together with any formulas p v q such that either p or q is in x, and any formulas -(p v q) 
such that both -p and -q are in x. Notice that + acts monotonically on theories: XV- C 
(x u y)t-. Intuitively + describes how truth values “propagate upwards” through 
formulas in the course of their evaluation. This intuition also applies to our use of i- 
to give the semantics of PDL, below. (An earlier version of this treatment had + preserve 
all statements, but this was found to lead to considerable clumsiness.) 
We shall sometimes write “s E xi-” as “x t-s”. 
The four predicates are as follows, where x’ denotes the complement of x. 
x consistent: %C x’ 
x complete: x’cn 
x Hintikka: XCXI- 
x closed: X+CX 
The first three of these predicates on theories are standard. Hintikka theories, or 
Hintikka sets, are sometimes called “downward saturated” sets. Thus one might call 
a theory that is closed in our sense “upward saturated.” 
Now suppose x is both consistent and complete, so 2 = x’. We may interpret x as 
defining a model by taking x to be the set of those statements assigned true, so that x’ 
is the set of those assigned false. Such an assignment satisfies the condition that s and 
NS are assigned different truth values. Suppose further that x is both Hintikka and closed, 
so xt- = x. It follows in the case of propositional calculus that p v q is in x if and only 
ifoneofporqisinx.Forifporqisinx,pvqisin~==.Converselyifpvqisin 
x = xt- then -(p v q) is not in XI- by consistency, so not both -p and -q are in x, 
so one of p or q is in x by completeness. 
With this reasoning in mind we formally define a model to be a complete consistent 
closed Hintikka theory. A model of the formula s is a model containing s. Ifs has a model 
then s is satis$able, otherwise we say that -s is valid. 
The sort of problem we want to solve is whether a given statement s is satisfiable. 
We shall show how to deal with this problem algorithmically by showing that the definition 
of “model” can be relaxed to just “consistent Hintikka theory” without affecting the 
definition of “satisfiable.” Weakening the four conditions to two in this way makes the 
search for a model feasible. 
Given that we shall be varying t-, there are certain properties of + that we will want 
to be able to rely on, in order to develop a theory of theories that is independent of the 
particular choice of t-. We want I- to be: 
(i) Literal-preserving: if s is a literal in x then x t- s. 
(ii) Continuous: if x0 C x1 c **. is an increasing chain of theories with union x 
then xt- = x0+- U xlt- U -** 
(iii) Dual: YI---NS if and only if Vx(x t- s -+ x n 7 # 0). 
(iv) Inductive: there exists a function h, the height function, mapping statements 
to natural numbers, such that literals are mapped to 0, and for any nonliteral s, if x +- s 
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for some x then there is some subset z of x such that z + s and every element of .a has 
height less than that of s. 
Continuity implies the monotonicity we mentioned earlier, as can be seen by con- 
sidering chains of length two. We use continuity in the main theorem of this section, 
that every consistent Hintikka set extends to a model. 
To understand duality consider first the only-if direction. This may be expressed as, 
if XI- u y+ is inconsistent (contains s and ws) then so is x u y; equivalently, if x u y 
is consistent so is XI- u y+. So taking x = y shows that if x is consistent so is x+. 
Now consider the other direction. If every theory x satisfying x + s is inconsistent 
with y then we deduce that YI- N s; equivalently, if yl‘ N s then there is some theory x 
consistent withy (though not necessarily consistent with all of y+, YH---, etc.) such that 
x + s. Viewed in terms of evaluating formulas, this says that if there are not enough 
values available to deduce in one step that s has value false, then it is possible to supply 
additional values not contradicting any existing values such that in one step s turns 
out to have value true. Nothing is said here about whether those supplied values are 
consistent with values calculated by ye--, yt-+-, etc., the supplied values are there just 
to make a point about one step of computation. 
For example in propositional calculus s may be either a literal P, a disjunction p v 9, 
or a conjunction -(p v 4). If every theory x for which x+ contains P is inconsistent 
with y then (P) is inconsistent with y, so y contains NP. If every theory x for which M-- 
contains p v 4 is inconsistent withy then {p} and {a} are inconsistent withy, soy contains 
wp and ~9, soy+ contains -(p v 4). If every theory x for which XI- contains -( p v a) 
is inconsistent with y then {-p, -q} is inconsistent with y, so y contains either p or q, 
so yt- contains p v q = --(p v q). 
The inductive property of t- formalizes the idea that statements of the language are 
all built from smaller statements, with the literals being the smallest statements, and that 
information about values of statements flows from smaller to larger statements. To see 
that propositional calculus is inductive, take h(P) = h(~P) = 0, and h(p v q) = 
h(-(P v 4)) = 1 + max(h(p), h(q)). If our intuition about the language of propositional 
calculus is correct this defines a function from formulas to natural numbers. If p v q 
is in xt- then either p or q is in X, so one of (p> or {q} supplies the appropriate subset z 
of x every element of which has height less than that ofp v q; and similarly for -(p v q). 
We now use these properties of +, and the fixed definitions of fand the four predicates, 
to establish some computationally useful facts. 
LEMMA 2.1. If x is consistent, complete and Hintikka then x is closed. 
Proof. x not closed means that XI- contains some s not in x, so since x is complete 
MS is in x. But then NS is in xt- since x is Hintikka. So xt- is not consistent, whence x 
is not consistent by duality, a contradiction. 1 
So our definition of “model” is unnecessarily strong; “closed” may be omitted from 
the definition. 
LEMMA 2.2. If x is Hintikka so is XF. 
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Proof. If x C p then by monotonicity of I-, X+ C xt-+-. 1 
So if x is Hintikka and consistent, so are x+, w, etc. Write xl-* for M-t. 
We now define x to be n-complete when x u ~contains all statements of height at most n. 
LEMMA 2.3. If y is n-complete then yt- is n + l-complete. 
Proof. Suppose NS is of height n + 1 but is not in ye. We shall show that s is in 
yt-. By duality there is some x consistent with y for which s is in xt--. But then by 
inductiveness there is some x C x every element of which is of height at most n, yet for 
which s is in zt-. Since x is consistent withy, so is x, but since y is n-complete .z must 
therefore be contained in y, so s is in y+ by monotonicity. 1 
THEOREM 2.4. If x is consistent, Hintikka, and O-complete then xt-* is a model. 
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 2.1 to 2.3. i 
A corollary of this that we shall not use directly in the sequel is that if x is consistent 
and Hintikka then x can be extended to a model (i.e. is a subset of a model). For x can 
be extended to a consistent O-complete Hintikka theory by adjoining to x one literal 
from each matched pair of literals neither of which appears in x. So to test whether s is 
satisfiable it suffices to search for some consistent Hintikka x containing s. For example 
the propositional calculus formula w((P v N(NP v Q)) v (R v w(mP v (-Q v R)))) 
can be seen to be satisfiable because it is contained in the consistent Hintikka theory 
containing the given formula together with “(P v w(wP v Q)), -P, -P v Q, Q, 
“(R v w(wP v (-Q v R))), NR, and -P v (-Q v R). If there is no consistent 
Hintikka theory containing s then there is no model, since a model is itself a consistent 
Hintikka theory. 
Theorem 3.3 below states the version of this corollary that we shall actually need for 
our algorithm. 
3. PDL SEMANTICS 
We now specify the semantic language and t- for Propositional Dynamic Logic. 
We begin with the set @ of PDL formulas and the set Z of PDL programs, as defined in 
section 1. We augment the language so that Z also includes all programs of the form 
-a, intended to mean that program that can do exactly what a cannot do. 
In order to define a statement, so that theories and models can then be defined, we 
assume we have a set W of states. W is not part of the syntax of PDL but rather part of 
the semantics, and may change from one model to another. However once W is chosen 
it then determines a semantic language for PDL whose statements are taken to be the 
elements of (WX CD) U (WX ZX W). W e call elements (24, p) of W X @ facts, writing 
them as u + p. We call elements (u, a, v) of W x .Z x W transitions, writing them as 
u(a)v. The literals of this semantic language are those facts and transitions whose second 
component is a possibly negated PDL atom, namely u /= P, ut== N P, u(A)er, and 
u(NA)o, for arbitrary U, v. 
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A PDL theory x may be envisaged as a graph each of whose vertices u E W is labelled 
with formulas p, namely those such that (u +p) E X, and each of whose edges from u to ZI 
is labelled with programs a, namely those such that u(a)v E X. Alternatively a separate 
labelled edge may be drawn for each transition. If the theory x is complete and consistent 
then for every fact u /== p either p or --p will label U, and for every transition u(a)v an 
edge will go from u to w labelled either a or MU. 
To present t- for PDL we adopt a tabular form of presentation, exemplified by the 
following table for propositional calculus. 
Pi-P”!l 
Qf---P”V 
-P, “Q t- -(P ” a) 
In this notation we write si ,..., sk t- t for {si ,..., sk} t- t. The function + defined in 
this way is taken to be minimal such that x+- contains s for each literal s in X, and contains 
t for each condition of the above form for which the left-hand side of the condition is 
a subset of X. (Minimality is defined by the obvious pointwise-inclusion ordering of 
functions.) It is apparent that t- defined thus is continuous. We shall arrange the tables 
we use so that duality and inductiveness follow from the particular tables, as in the above 
example. (We could save on about half of the table for PDL by making duality a require- 
ment, but the reader would find it harder to deduce the nature of I-.) 
We shall make a practice of using such abbreviations as p v -q for -(p A q), so 
that the last line of the above table would read 
In the following table we abbreviate u + -(a)~ to u + [u] -p. 
(A cut-set of a directed graph separating vertices u, v is a minimal set of edges whose 
removal from the graph would eliminate all paths from u to ZI. K, is the complete graph 
W X W on vertex set W.) 
TABLE I 
Standard Semantics 
<a> u<a>v, v I= P + u I= <Q)P 
< I> ul==P + U<P?h 
<u> u<a>v I-- u<a u b>v 
<u> u<b)v t- u<a v b)v 
<;> u<a>v, v@>w t-- u(a; b)w 
<*> uo(a>ul ,..., uk-,<ah I-- uo<a*>uli k > 0 
:3 
{u(wz>vorv~p~verFV} k-- u I= [QlP 
u t= -p + u<-(P ?)>u 
ET!, 
b- u<-(p ?)>v (v # u) 
u<vz)v, u<-b>v + ~(-(a u b))v 
{u(-a)v or v(-b)w 1 v E W) I-- 4-b; b)>v 
{w<-u>w’ 1 (w, w’) E C} I- u<-(a*)>v for any cut-set C of Kw separating u, v. 
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The (a) rule says that if a can go from u to V, and if p holds in U, then in u it is true 
that a can bring about p. The ( ?) rule says that if p holds in u then p ? can go from u 
to u. The next two rules say that if either Q or b can go from u to o, so can a u b. Rule 
(;> says that if a can go from u to w and b can go from w to w then a; b can go from u 
to w. Finally rule {*) says that if a can go from u,, to ur , and from n1 to u2 , and so on up 
to ulc , then a* can go from u, to ulc . 
The remaining rules are present simply to make +-- dual. We may interpret them in 
a natural way however. The [a] rule says that if for every ZI in W, either a cannot get from 
u to a or p holds in w, then in u it is the case that a guarantees p (in the sense that if a 
halts p must then hold). The [ ?] rules say that if p does not hold in u then p ? cannot 
get from u to u, and that p? cannot travel from one state to another (i.e. is side-effect 
free). The [u] rule says that if neither a nor b can get from I( to w, neither can a u b. 
Rule [;I says that if for every state w in W, either a cannot get from u to w or b cannot get 
from w to w, then a; b cannot get from u to w. And the rule [*] says that if every sequence 
of states starting with u and ending with w includes a consecutive pair w, w’ such that 
a cannot get from w to w’, then a* cannot get from u to w. 
The reader should not be in doubt that this semantics captures the appropriate meaning 
of the PDL constructs. 
’ Nonstandard PDL semantics 
We now modify the above semantics in several ways to facilitate the development 
of our tableau method. None of these modifications have to do with propositional issues- 
in fact the standard semantics for propositional calculus can be used directly in the 
derivation of the usual tableau method. 
We first give a nonstandard semantics that is not quite right, though very plausible. 
It is the semantics one would infer from the methods of [6]. 
TABLE II 
Tentative Nonstandard Semantics 
<A)- 
< o- 
<u>- 
<u>- 
<;>- 
<*>- 
<*>- 
[Al- 
[?I- 
[?I- 
[VI- 
M- 
1*1- 
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The rule (A) restates rule (a) of the standard semantics, restricted to atomic programs, 
and similarly [A]- restates [u]. These are the only rules of this semantics that mention 
more than one state. Rule ( ?)- says that if p and Q hold then (p ?)q holds, always in 
the same state U. The two (u)- rules say that if (a)p or (b)p hold then so does (a u b)p. 
The (;)- rule says that if (a)(b)p holds then so does (a; b)p. The (*) rules say that if 
either p or (u)(u*)p hold then so does (a*)~. The fl- rules are the obvious duals of 
these rules. 
The problem with this semantics lies entirely with the (*)- rules, which are too 
permissive. (u)(u*)p may hold in every state, whence <a*)~ would also hold in every 
state, yet p may still hold in no state! This is clearly inconsistent with the standard 
semantics for (a*)~, which requires the existence of a path of u’s leading to a state in 
which p holds. What is missing is some form of an induction rule. 
One way to deal with this problem is to retain the standard semantics of the nonliteral 
programs ((;) etc.), and replace the two (*)- rules with the one rule: 
<*>- u(a*h v i= P e- u I= <a*>p 
We shall adopt another approach, which avoids reintroducing the standard semantics 
of the nonliteral programs, at the price of introducing a third type of statement, the 
link s =S t where s and t are facts. The role of links is to keep track of paths between 
states that would otherwise have to be looked after by the semantics of the nonliteral 
programs. We present the nonstandard semantics based on links, then discuss the role 
of the links. 
The (s-)+ rule says that if there is a chain of links from the fact u + (u)p to the fact 
v b p then the fact u /= (a& is true. Thus we should expect that links are taking over 
TABLE III 
Nonstandard Semantics 
<A)+ 
< 9+ 
<“>+ 
<“>+ 
<;>+ 
<*>+ 
<*>+ 
14, 
;I;: 
K+ 
[*I+ 
u(Ah v I= P ++ ~+<A)P*v~P 
ul=P,ukq I-+ ~i=<P?>q*~I=c? 
u b <a& ++ u b <a ” blp =a u k <a>~ 
u I= <b>p t--+ u + <a U b)p a u k <b>p 
u t= <a><b>p t--i u I= <a; bjp I= u k-= <a)(b)p 
Ut=P t--+ u I= <a*>p I= u /= p 
u b <a><a*>p +-+ u I= <a*>p * u I= <a><n*>p 
{u(-A>vorv~pIv~W) I--+ 11 k VIP 
Ul=P t--i- u k r,P ?I4 
u t= -P +-+ u k CP ‘)I4 
u I= HP, u k VIP t-+ u I== [a ” blp 
u t= bl[blP ++ u k [a; blp 
u b P, u k [alb*lP ++ u b [a*lP 
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the role of transitions in keeping track of relevant paths. How this is accomplished can 
be seen in part by considering the remaining rules. All the ( ) rules have only a link on 
their right hand side. In general the rule will have the form s ++ t Z- s, corresponding 
to the previous semantics, which had s ++ t. The idea is that we shall be a little more 
cautious about admitting t given s. We first admit a link t * s, and then if a chain of 
links from t to an appropriate fact can be found we will admit t itself. This caution 
makes itself felt mainly on the (*) rules, which now cannot result in making (a*)p 
true without more concrete evidence of the existence of a path of Q’S. 
For example, suppose we have the literals u(A)w, o(B)w, and w k P in a theory X. 
(So x is Hintikka since + is literal-preserving, so x C xt- C x+2 C ***) We would expect 
that u + (A; B)P should be in x+-‘l for some n. Rule (A)+ puts v /= (B)P =c- w k P 
into xs, along with other facts and links we do not care about. Then (a)+ puts 
v + (B)P into x9. Now (A)+ puts u /= (A)(B)P + w + (B)P into x+-3. Rule 
(+)+ then puts u + (A)(B)P into e4. By rule (;)+ x+~ gets u + (A; B)P G= 
u /= (A)(B)P. But then x+5 contains the chain u + (A;B)P G- u + <A)(B)P a 
v + (B)P * w + P, so rule (a)+ puts u + {A; B)P in x4. So our objective has 
been reached, in 6 steps of computation. 
The other < )+ rules may be exercised in an analogous manner, for example to show 
that w + (A u B)P, w k (B*)P, and v + (B*)P will all eventually be added to x 
by++. 
By now the reader should suspect that if x starts out with various literal facts and 
transitions then XI-* and xi--*, will end up with the same facts. The following lemmas 
state and prove this intuition formally. 
We define +-Hintikka to mean Hintikka with respect to the nonstandard semantics. 
The observant reader will have noticed that ++ is not inductive, thanks to the rules 
[*I+ and (*)+ . Also it is not dual since negative links have not been treated. However 
this is a minor detail; we could easily make it dual by adding further rules, or just saying 
that the I-- defined was the least dual one satisfying the conditions; in fact it will turn 
out that we do not need duality for ++ but only for the standard semantics +. 
We now wish to show that, for the purposes of defining satisfiability of a PDL formula, 
the nonstandard semantics is equivalent to the standard semantics. Our strategy will be 
as follows. Let h be the height function for the standard semantics, let x, be defined 
as (s E x 1 h(s) < n}, and let x, be the part of x containing only facts and literal transitions. 
TakingRasx,u(V-((x,,u%O)) h w ere I’ is the set of all propositional and program 
variables, we shall prove that if x is consistent and +-Hintikka, then x, C 6”. By 
observing that 2 is consistent, O-complete and Hintikka we infer that if u + p E x then 
A---* is a model of u + p, whence p is satisfiable. We also prove the converse: if u k p 
has a model it occurs in some consistent +-Hintikka theory. This gives us a useful 
test for satisfiability: see whether u + p belongs to some consistent + -Hintikka theory. 
The double induction of the proof of the main theorem has a sufficiently delicate 
“inner induction” that we isolate it as two lemmas, which in essence treat the two 
directions of the inner induction. For each of these lemmas we assume (as part of the 
“outer” induction hypothesis) that x is +-Hintikka and that n is a positive integer 
such that for 0 < m < n, x, C A%-~, and 9+m is consistent, m-complete and Hintikka. 
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The proofs are not unduly long by line count, but they are rather tedious to check, 
and the reader may prefer to skip the details on a first reading of the paper. 
LEMMA 3.1. If u k [c]p E x and h(c) < n, then for all v E W either U(-C)V E $I--” 
or v + p E x. 
Proof. We use induction on h(c). 
u I= E4PEX. BY VI+ 3 u(mA)v or v /= p E x for all VIE W. Since h(wA) = 0, 
u(~A)v~xOCRC~+~orv/=pExforallv~W. 
u + [p ?]q E x. By [ ?], for all v # u u(-(p ?))v E A- C A?+-~. For v = u, we have 
by [ ?]+ u + -p or II + q E x. If the latter we are done. Otherwise, since h(+) < n - 1, 
u t= --p E x,el C A--l, so by < ?) u(-(p ?))u E A---“. 
u /= [a u b]p E x. By [u]+ u + [alp, u + [b]p E x. So by induction, for all v E W 
u(~a)v E &n-r or v + p E x, and for all v E W u(-b)v E &-n-r or v + p E x. Thus 
for all v E W u(wa)v, u{-b)v E &--‘+l or v + p E x. So by [U], for all v E W 
u(-(a U b))v E 2wn or v + p. 
u I= [a; 4~ E x. BY [;I+ u I= b#lp E x, so by induction u(wa)v E ~&n-l or v + 
[b]p E x for all v, and so again by induction u(wa)v E 21--%-l or v(A)w E &-n-l or 
w /= p E x for all v, w. But then u(-(a; b))w E ~6~ or w k p E x for all w. 
u k [a*]p E x: Suppose that for some v E W, u(N(a*))v #A&~ and v /= p 4x. 
Since h(u(-a*)v) < 1z and 6% is n-complete, u(a*)v E $I-~, i.e. (Ln-l) + u(a*)v. 
Since x+--“-l is Hintikka, q,(a) u1 ,..., uk.l(a) uk E &I-+-~ for some ua ,..., uk , K > 0, 
where u,, = u and uk = v, by (*). Now by [*]p, u. k p, u. + [a][a*]p EX. So by 
induction either uo(-a) ur E A---+l or u, /= p E x. The former is ruled out by the 
presence in &-‘+I of uo{a) u, and the consistency of A-a-l. We may continue in this 
way to show ue kp,..., U, /= p E x by induction on k, contradicting v /= p 4 x since 
et=&. 1 
LEMMA 3.2. For all formulas of the form Lp = (cl)(cz) *a* (c,>p, g > 0, if u + 
<c> LP a* w+p~xandh(c)<n, thereexistsv~Wsuchthatu~{c)Lp=>*v~ 
Lp ** w ~p~xaandu(c)v~&---“. 
Proof. We use induction on h(c), assuming u + (c) Lp * * w + p E x. 
c = A. Then u + (A)Lp * v /=Lp a* w +psx and u(A)v~x, by (A). Since 
h(A) = 0, u(A)v E x0 C 9~~. 
c =p?. Then u + (p?)Lp * u +Lp **w /=PEX, and u +PEX, by <?). So 
u + p E x,+.~ C x%+-l by induction, whence u<p ?)u E LQ+~ by ( ?). 
c = a u 6. Then without loss of generality u k (a U b) Lp a u + (a) Lp ** v k 
Lp ** w k p EX and u(a)v E $++l, by (u) and induction. So u(a u b)v E &-n 
by <We 
c=a;b. Then u~(a;b)Lp*~/=(a)(b)Lp~*v~~b)Lp=z-*v’+Lp+* 
w k p E x and u(a)v, v<b)v’ E&-+~, by (;) and induction (twice). So u(a; b)v’ E 
hn by C>. 
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c = a*. Then, taking us = u, u,, + (a*) Lp *u. I= (a>(a*>LP **% I= (a*>LP 
s- u1 + (a)(a*) Lp S-* u2 t= *** * u, + (a*) Lp * u, + Lp ** w + p E x and 
uo<a> ul, ul<a> us ,..., fhda> urn E *m-l, by (*) and induction (m > 0 times). 
Since u + (c) Lp * * w + p is finite, m must be too. Hence z&a*) u, E 21-n by (*). 1 
THEOREM 3.3. Let x be consistent and +-Hintikka. Then x, can be extended to a 
PDL model. 
Proof. We first show by induction that for all n > 0, x, C A%-~. 
Certainly x0 C A-0, by construction of 2. Now suppose that the inductive claim holds 
for n, and that s E x,+~ . If s is u + [c]p with h(mc), h(p) < n then by lemma 3.1 
u(wc)v E A--n or v + p E x for all v E W, and v + p E x, C f~-~ by induction. So by [a], 
# + [c]p E &n+l. If s is u + (c)p with h(c), h(p) < n then by (s), for some w E W 
u I= <a>$ ** w + p. So by lemma 3.2 (taking g = 0) there exists a such that u k 
(c)P ** v~p~xandu(c)v~kt-~.Soby(~),s~v~pforsomes~~,sobythe 
appropriate ( )+ condition v + p E x, C km. Hence u b <c)p E A--a+l. This establishes 
that x,+r C ~%~+r. 
It follows that x, C A-*. Since 4 is consistent (since x is), O-complete (by construction), 
and Hintikka, k+* is a model by Theorem 3.4. l 
THEOREM 3.4. If x is a PDL model then x can be extended to a consistent + -Hintikka 
theory merely by adding links. 
Proof. The reader may verify that the [ ]+ conditions are all met by any PDL model x. 
The links to be added to x to meet the ( )+ conditions are u + (A)p * v t= p whenever 
u<Ah vl=:P, UI=WPEX, ul=<<pV G- u + q whenever u + p, u + q, u + 
(p ?)q E x, and similarly for the links named in the other < )+ conditions. These additions 
satisfy (A)+ through (*)+ by construction. The reader may verify that the additions 
also satisfy ( *)+ automatically. 1 
It follows that u b p is satisfiable if and only if u + p E x for some consistent 
+-Hintikka theory x, by Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. Henceforth we shall work 
only with I-+ semantics, permitting us to drop the + without ambiguity. 
4. TABLEAUX 
In section 2 we disposed of the properties of being closed and complete, leaving the 
properties of being consistent and Hintikka. We now show how to use the classical 
method of tableaux [2, 9, 22, 231, via the nonstandard semantics, to test for satisfiability 
of PDL formulas. The tableau method has two parts: tableau construction, which takes 
care of the Hintikka property, and tableau testing, which takes care of consistency. 
We begin with easy-to-grasp but not very effective constructions and tests, and gradually 
make them more effective to yield the final algorithm. 
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A tableau for the PDL formula r is a rooted unordered tree whose vertices are labelled 
with finite theories, the root being labelled with w k r for an arbitrarily chosen state w. 
We use the terms “parent,” “child,” “sibling,” for the obvious relationships among 
vertices, using “descendant” for the reflexive transitive closure of the “child” relation. 
A representutiwe of a Hintikka theory x is a theory y such that there exists a renaming 
of the states in y making y C X. (The renaming need not keep distinct states distinct, 
but it should rename all occurrences of a given state to the same new state.) The properties 
we want a tableau to have are that the union of the theories along any path of a tableau 
is a Hintikka theory, and every Hintikka theory has a representative corresponding to 
some path. We now give a construction for a tableau for I that has this property. 
There will be no fixed W during this construction; instead each step of the construction 
will take W to be whatever states have been needed so far for the construction. 
We will grow the tableau starting from the root and adding to the leaves. Begin by 
selecting an arbitrary state w (drawn from some suitable supply such as the natural 
numbers) and making {w i== r} the root of the tableau. 
We now describe the process of extending a leaf V of the tableau, by adding V’s children 
to the tableau. Suppose V is labelled with theory x. We shall assume that x is finite and 
has some order ( on its statements. The purpose of the order is to prescribe a rule for 
selecting elements of x, which we can imagine form a queue. 
If x is Hintikka V has no children. Otherwise the children of V are determined by the 
first s in x (under the order ( on x) not in XI-. For each minimal z (minimal under set 
inclusion) such that z + s construct a child V’ of V whose theory is x u a, ordered 
so that x - s < x < s. (Thus z goes on the end of the queue, then s is moved to the end 
of the queue.) The order on z can be arbitrary. 
The minimal z’s will be precisely the sets matching the left hand side of the non- 
standard semantics rule having s on its right hand side (see Table III). In most cases z 
will have one or two statements, and there will be one or two 2’s. Thus if s were u p 
[p ?]q then there would be two singleton x’s, {u k q} and (u /= -p}. Ifs were u + [a*]~ 
then there would be just one z, namely {U /== p, u b [a][u*]p}. If s were the link u /= 
(a*)p 3 u /= (u)(u*)p then there would be just {u + (u)(u*)$J}. 
A more complicated case is when s is of the form u /= [Alp. In this case we take W 
to consist of all states mentioned in facts, statements, or links of theories labelling vertices 
from here back to the root of the tableau. This will be a finite set, since the theories are all 
finite by construction and the path itself is finite (each step of the process happens after 
a finite time). If this W has n states then there will be 2” z’s, each determined by whether 
it contains u(-A)v or v + p for each v in W. 
The least obvious case is when s has the form u /== (a&. Then there will be infinitely 
many z’s, each consisting of a finite chain s => s, 5 sa G- *.a =z= e, l= p of links. In each 
such chain all states except u are new, that is, do not appear along the path back to the 
root; we may assume that all these new states are drawn from the natural numbers, or 
some equally large set. The intermediate facts in the chain may be arbitrary. 
LEMMA 4.1. The union of theories along any path of a tableau constructed in this way 
is a Hintikku theory. 
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Proof. Suppose not. Let x be such a union with x f s for some s E x. If s is not of 
the form u t= [Alp then y )’ s for every y along the path in question. At some point 
along the path s appears, say with m statements ahead of it on the queue. The construction 
ensures that within m steps s will be attended to, guaranteeing that x + s in the union. 
If s is of the form u + [Alp, the construction may not deal fully with s at any one step 
because not all of W is present. Now suppose x ]L s on account of the absence of both 
I((-A)v and v k p for some v appearing in x. When v first appears on the path, s 
immediately becomes eligible for processing, and will be attended to within m steps, where 
m is the number of statements ahead of s on the queue as before. When s appears one of 
u{-A)v or v /== p will be added to the theory, a contradiction. u 
LEMMA 4.2. Every Hintikka theory containing w t= r has a representative that is the 
union of theories along some path of the tableau constructed above. 
Proof. Let y be a Hintikka theory containing w k T. We show by induction on i 
that there exists a path such that every theory x0 , xi ,... on that path is a representative 
of y. This is immediate for the root theory x0 = {w + r}. Now suppose xi _C y where 
xj is xi labelling V with states renamed appropriately. If X, is Hintikka we are at a leaf 
and X, is the desired representative union. Otherwise let s be the element of X, chosen 
by the tableau for processing at V. Let z be such that xi u x labels a child of V and 
x’ C y for some renaming of states consistent with the renaming of xi to xi . Such a a 
must exist since X: C y and y is Hintikka. The choice of z ensures that xi, is a represen- 
tative of y. 
It follows that x0 u x, u -0. as constructed is a representative of y. 1 
Thus our tableau construction amounts to a thorough search for Hint&a theories. 
Every path in the tableau yields a Hintikka theory, and every Hintikka theory containing 
w k r is represented by some path. In this way we have taken care of the Hintikka 
property, leaving only the issue of consistency. 
A Test for Satisfiability 
We call a test of satisfiability of statements sound when it never claims that a satisfiable 
statement is unsatisfiable, and complete when it never claims that an unsatisfiable statement 
is satisfiable. These terms are motivated by the application of a satisfiability tester to 
validity checking, where their meaning coincides with normal usage. 
Our basic test is that r is satisfiable if and only if the union of the theories along some 
path of a tableau for Y is consistent. Completeness follows from the fact that if such a 
consistent theory is found, it must also be Hintikka by lemma 4.1 and contain w + r, 
whence r is satisfiable. To verify soundness, suppose that r is satisfiable. Then there 
exists a consistent Hintikka theory y containing w + T, whence some path yields a 
representative of y by lemma 4.2. If the representative is inconsistent then so is the result 
of renaming states in that representative, whence so is y, a contradiction. Thus the repre- 
sentative is consistent. 
Inspecting all paths is less convenient than inspecting all vertices, or even all vertices 
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standing in the descendant relation to one another. Define the predicate bad on vertices 
to be the least predicate such that bad(V) holds when: 
(i) V’s label is inconsistent, or 
(ii) all V’s children are bad, unless V has no children. 
The least predicate satisfying these conditions may be formed as the intersection of all 
predicates satisfying them; the intersection can readily be seen to satisfy the conditions. 
LEMMA 4.3. In the tableau constructed above for r, r is satis$able if and only if the root 
is not bad. 
Proof. (If.) If the root is not bad there must be a path of good vertices from the root, 
the union of whose theories must then be consistent. The union is a Hintikka theory by 
Lemma 4.1, and contains w /= r by construction, so by Theorem 3.3 can be extended to 
a model. Hence r is satisfiable. 
(Only if.) If r is satisfiable then by Theorem 3.4 there is a consistent Hintikka theory y 
such that w + Y E y. Since y is Hintikka there is a path in the tableau the union of whose 
theories represents y. Since y is consistent so is the union. Now suppose some vertex on 
this path were bad. Then we could find a lesser badness predicate just by making all 
vertices on this path good. It should be clear that the resulting badness predicate is lesser, 
and satisfies the above conditions (i) and (ii). 1 
The “if” direction corresponds to completeness, the “only if” direction to soundness. 
The Marking Procedure 
We would like to identify the bad vertices by a process that takes w stages to mark 
the bad vertices. In stage 0 it marks the vertices whose theories are inconsistent. In stage 
i + 1 it marks those vertices all of whose children if any have been marked at earlier 
stages (not marking if there are no children) and all vertices labelled with a theory 
containing u k (a)p with no descendant labelled with a theory in which u k (a)p 
closes. Then the root is bad if and only if it is marked by this procedure. (We defer proof 
of correctness of the marking procedure until we have the tableau in its final form.) 
This is our basic marking procedure, almost in its final form despite the fact that a quite 
different kind of tableau will be used ultimately. 
It now remains to make the process finite. We shall achieve this in two steps. First 
we modify the way in which we deal with chains in connection with rule (a}. Then 
take advantage of a theorem due to Fischer and Ladner [6] that says that only finitely 
many distinct formulas will appear in the tableau constructed for r by this modified 
method. It then becomes possible to represent the entire tableau as a finite object by 
introducing loops. With the tableau represented in this way the above marking procedure 
then requires only finitely many steps. 
Dealing with Chains 
We modify the rule ( =c-) used in constructing tableaux to: 
<*‘> u I= <a>P * t +- u I= <a& 
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That is, u + (a& now calls only for the first link, not the whole chain connecting 
u + (a)p to v + p. With this modification we lose the completeness property of tableaux 
that every path yields a theory that is Hintikka with respect to the unmodified conditions. 
On the other hand we do retain the soundness property that for every Hintikka y such that 
x0 C y some path yields a subset of y. This is because of the “self-propagating” nature 
of intermediate links of a chain u k (a)p 3 si , si * sa ,..., sk-r * v + p. Every si 
except possibly the final v + p is of the form U’ /= (a’) p’, and hence there must be some 
path which eventually accumulates all the links of such a chain, by inspection of the 
semantics. 
We restore completeness as follows. Define u + (u)p to complete in x when there is a 
chain of links u /= (a)~ 3* v + p in x for some v. Define x to be chain-complete 
when for every u /= (a)~ C x, u + <u)p completes in x. Modify the path-oriented 
test to consider only paths the union of whose labels is chain-complete. The modified 
test can now be seen to be sound and complete, as the tableau overlooks no possible 
way of achieving chain-completeness. 
It can be shown that if suffices to require every u + (a*)~ in x to complete, which 
leads to a more efficient test. We do not explore this issue here. 
The corresponding modification to our vertex-oriented test is to add a third alternative 
to the definition of bad. 
(iii) u l= <a)p is in the theory labelling V but every descendant of V in whose 
theory u + (a)~ completes is bad. 
That this new criterion for badness is well-defined follows from the fact that the set of 
all badness predicates satisfying the disjunction of (i), (ii), and (iii) is closed under 
arbitrary intersection and so has a minimal element, the intended badness predicate. 
The new criterion also restores Lemma 4.3 when (3’) replaces (3). The “only if” 
(soundness) direction of the proof goes through by the above remarks about intermediate 
links of a chain propagating themselves. The “if” direction (completeness) follows 
because condition (iii) amounts to requiring that there exist a path from any good vertex 
containing u /= (u)p to a good vertex where u + (a)~ completes. Hence we can construct 
a path from the root in such a way that every u /= (a)~ completes. To do this, follow good 
vertices down from the root until a vertex V is reached where u + (a)~ appears in the 
theory at I’. Now choose some good vertex below V where u l= (a)~ completes; such 
a vertex must exist by condition (iii) on badness. The path goes down to this vertex. 
Every vertex along this path must be good, otherwise the lowest bad vertex on this path 
would be labelled with an inconsistent theory, whence so would the vertex at the end of 
the path, contradicting its goodness. Now if there are any other facts u’ k (a’)~’ in the 
theory at I’ (not at the current vertex) then continue this path further to another vertex 
where u’ l= <a’) p’ completes, and so on until all facts of the form u l= (a)~ at V have 
been taken care of. Now resume following good vertices until some new fact of this form 
appears, and repeat the above procedure for it and all its colleagues of that form in the 
theory of that vertex. This process defines a path in the tableau which yields a theory in 
which every fact of the form u + (a)~ completes, which therefore is Hintikka with respect 
to the original t-+ semantics containing <a)+ . 
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Finiteness 
We have now accomplished as much as is possible without the following theorem, 
which we need to make our tableau construction into an algorithm that always terminates, 
and to make our marking procedure both effective and terminating. 
THEOREM 4.4. If r is of Zmgth n, \{p 1 3u(u + p appears in a tableau for r)}j < n. 
Note that a tableau for Y is one constructed according to the above rules, and as such 
will be quite limited as to what u k p’s it will contain. This is essentially lemma 3.2 of 
[6], to which we refer the reader for a proof. 
This leads us to the observation that, for any u, at most 71 distinct statements ZJ + p 
can appear in a tableau for a formula r of length 7t. A second observation is that any 
statement v /= p # w + r in the tableau can be attributed to one of only three sources: 
u+@lP=-v/=P9u+r~lP, or some statement naming no state other than V. We 
shall arrange things so that these three sources are processed in three batches in the order 
given. In this way all statements of the form u + p and u + p 3 t will be formed while 
processing these three batches. Furthermore, processing of II /= (A)p S- v k p and 
u b [Alpwillb e e 1 ft until the end of the third batch, as they belong to the first and second 
batches respectively of other states. We postpone a more specific account to after the 
next step. 
Lean Tableaux 
Our next objective is to reduce the theories in the tableau to the point where the only 
statements in a theory are of the form u + p and u + p S- t, for fixed u; we call such 
a theory a theory of u. 
To achieve this requires not merely reducing the theories but also splitting a simple 
vertex into as many vertices as are required for each to carry a theory of a single state and 
still have the new tableau retain the information in the old tableau. 
We make these vague notions more precise by introducing the concept of a full theory, 
which is one that is “as Hintikka as a theory of a state can be.” More formally, a theory x 
of state u is fd when x t-s for all s E x except those of the form u + <A)p G- v + p 
and u + [Alp, and otherwise is partial. A full (partial) vertex is one so labelled. 
We introduce a new kind of tableau, the lean tableau, in which xi C xi+i is no longer 
guaranteed for consecutive theories along a path. Lean tableaux enjoy the following 
properties. 
(i) The root as before is labelled with {w + r}, w arbitrary. 
(ii) For each vertex V labelled with a partial theory x there exists some s E x not 
of the form I( + (Alp C- v k 4 or u l= [Alp such that the descendants of V are each 
labelled with some minimal theory z such that I t- s and x C x, and every such minimal 
theory labels some descendant. 
(iii) For each vertex V labelled with a full theory x each statement u /= <A)p 5 
;Ayqp E]X corresponds to a descendant of V whose theory is {v + p> u {v + q [ u + 
EX. 
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Note that lean tableaux contain no transitions. Moreover, a partial vertex has either 
one or two children while a full vertex may have up to n children where n is the length of r. 
We now describe a test for satisfiability in terms of lean tableaux. The test is just a 
straightforward modification of the one we used on ordinary tableaux. A fat path in 
a lean tableau is a maximal set of paths such that any two paths have a common initial 
segment terminating in a full vertex. Thus for any full vertex appearing in a fat path, 
all the children of that vertex also appear in the path, while for any partial vertex 
appearing, exactly one child also appears. The point of fat paths is that they correspond 
to ordinary paths in ordinary tableaux. 
LEMMA 4.5. In a lean tableau, if the union of the labels of a fat path is chain-complete 
it is a Hintikka theory. 
Proof. The construction of lean tableaux is such that only nonstandard conditions 
[A], (a) and (A) might be violated. (a) is taken care of explicitly by requiring chain- 
completeness. Now for each u + (Alp > w b p in the union add u(A)s. This suffices 
for condition (A) as property (iii) of lean tableaux supplies v + p. Finally, for each 
pair of states u, v appearing in the union such that u(A)v is not in the theory add u(~A)v. 
Then for every u + [Alp and for every v appearing in the theory, one of u(wA)v or 
‘u + p is also in the theory, by property (iii) of lean tableaux. 1 
LEMMA 4.6. For every Hintikka theory y containing I, any lean tableau for r contains 
a fat path the union of whose labels is a chain-complete subset of y to within renaming of states. 
Proof. The construction of such a path parallels the construction in the ordinary 
tableau case, except that (i) instead of a sequence of vertices being developed, each 
labelled with a subset of y to within renaming, we have an advancing frontier of vertices, 
and (ii) the induction hypothesis must be that the union of the labels of all vertices seen 
thus far is a subset of y to within renaming (since we no longer have xi C xi+r all along 
a path, even if xi is taken to be the union of the frontier’s labels at the ith step). 1 
We immediately infer: 
COROLLARY 4.7. Given a lean tableau for r, r is satisjable zf and only if the union of 
the labels of some fat path is consistent and chain-complete. 
The Lean Procedure 
This path oriented test can be translated into a vertex oriented test as for ordinary 
tableaux, the lean procedure. The procedure is to mark all the inconsistent vertices at 
stage 0, then at stage i + 1 mark all full vertices with a child marked at stage i, all partial 
vertices with all children marked at stage i or before, and every vertex containing some 
u + (a)p not linked by a chain of * statements at vertices (anywhere in the tableau) 
unmarked at stage i leading to v k p in an unmarked vertex. 
LEMMA 4.8. The lean procedure leaves the root of a tableau for r unmarked ;f and only 
if r is satisfiable. 
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Proof. Suppose r is satisfiable. Then the union of some fat path is a consistent 
chain-complete theory. Now consider the first stage in the marking process at which a 
vertex on that path was marked. If it was marked on account of inconsistency then the 
union cannot be inconsistent. If it was marked as a full vertex with marked child then this 
cannot be the first stage at which a vertex on this path was marked. If it was marked as a 
partial vertex with only marked children then again this cannot be the first stage. (Note 
that in a lean tableau every partial vertex has at least one child.) If it was marked for not 
being linked to v /= p via unmarked vertices then we use the fact that in the union of 
the labels of a fat path all statements of the form u /= p and u + p G- t label vertices 
of a single ordinary path within that fat path and going from a child of a full vertex to 
another full vertex. Hence all constituents of a chain starting u k <a)p 5 ... that are 
in the theory of u can be found in the full vertex at the end of a path containing the occur- 
rence of u + (a)p responsible for the marking. This chain must continue in exactly 
one of the children of this full vertex, and so on until completion. The whole chain (to 
be precise, an occurrence of every link of the chain) then appears entirely within the given 
fat path, whence if there is a link of the chain in the fat path no occurrence of which 
is at an unmarked vertex, again we cannot be at the first stage when this fat path was 
marked. Hence at no stage can any vertex of this fat path, including the root, be 
marked. 
Conversely, suppose the root is not marked at stage i for any finite i. Construct a fat 
path as follows. Initialize the set S of vertices to contain just the root. Proceeding by 
stages, at each stage, add to S all the children of each full vertex in S, and an unmarked 
child of each partial vertex in S not already having a child in S. Whenever a vertex 
labelled with u /= (a)p is added to S, add to S some full vertex below that vertex that 
contains as much of the promised chain for u /= (a)p as appears in the theory of u (this 
full vertex must exist), along with all vertices between the two vertices, then follow the 
chain into the next state and continue adding states until the end of the chain is reached, 
a finite process. (As we have described it, an entire chain is added as part of a single 
stage.) By the marking process it should be evident that every vertex in S remains 
unmarked. Hence at the end the theory labelling that path must be consistent (since 
inconsistent formulas must belong to the theory of the same state and hence appear 
together in the full vertex of the part of the path going through that full state) and chain- 
complete (by the construction). Hence r must be satisfiable. 1 
We define two vertices to be equivalent when their theories are the same to within 
renaming of states, and two trees to be equivalent when their roots are equivalent and 
to every subtree of one root corresponds an equivalent subtree of the other. Since each 
theory can have at most n formulas to within renaming, there can be at most 2” mutually 
inequivalent vertices. We also observe that if equivalent vertices always have the same 
set of labels on their children (easily arranged by having a method of choosing s that 
depends only on the particular partial theory being extended) then two trees with equi- 
valent roots are equivalent. 
Inspection of the marking algorithm reveals that equivalent trees will be marked 
identically, whence equivalent vertices will all be marked simultaneously. Hence the 
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marking cannot proceed for more than 2” stages without reaching some stage at which 
nothing new is marked, after which nothing new is ever marked. 
This suggests that we j&r the tableau (the term used by modal logicians for the 
process used in the proof in [6] of the finite model theorem). That is, we identify equi- 
valent vertices to yield a directed graph, instead of a tree, having at most 2” vertices. 
Such a graph can be effectively constructed by a machine. 
To construct the graph using a random-access machine it suffices to construct a lean 
tableau, represented say using bit vectors of length 11 to encode each theory, and to 
keep an eye out for repeated states. Since our algorithm is going to use exponential 
storage anyway in the worst case, one may as well set aside an array of 2* locations 
indexed by the bit vector representation of theories to represent which theories (modulo 
state names) have been encountered and where they are in storage. All this can be done 
in time proportional to 2” times some small polynomial in n. 
The marking procedure applied to this filtered tableau will at stage i mark exactly 
those vertices that are the image of vertices in the unfiltered tableau marked at stage i. 
Hence the root of the filtered graph will be marked if and only if the root of the un- 
filtered graph was marked by the procedure. 
While the marking time is not linear in the number of vertices in the graph, it is 
clearly proportional to a small polynomial in the number of vertices, establishing our 
upper bound of cn for some c. The non-linearity is due entirely to checking for chains. A 
crude method of checking would be to compute the transitive closure of the chain relation 
on the 722” facts appearing in the graph after each stage of checking, which would lead 
c = 16 if a cubic-time transitive-closure algorithm were used. This can be reduced to 
c = 8 by taking advantage of the fact that only two links can have the same first statement, 
whence their are only 2n2” links. Further reduction may be possible. As a practical 
matter, one can expect the number of vertices in the graph to be quite small typically 
(e.g. in a program verification context), whence the important issue is whether one can 
reduce the marking time to say the square or better of the number of vertices, an issue 
we do not go into here. 
The marking procedure as described requires the marking to be done in stages, with 
all marks made in stage i + 1 depending only on marks made at or before stage i. This is 
a little inconvenient to program, and the simpler procedure of having each mark depend 
on all marks made up till now, including those made at the current stage, will also work. 
This can be seen to be true by carrying out the proof of correctness of the unfiltered 
marking procedure modified so that at each stage only one equivalence class of vertices 
is marked. The procedure still halts in finitely many steps since there are only finitely 
many equivalence classes. 
1. S. K. B~su AND R. T. YEH, Strong verification of programs, IEEE Trans. Software Engrg. 
SE-l, No. 3 (1975), 339-345. 
2. E. W. BETH, “The Foundations of Mathematics,” North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1959. 
3. A. E. CHANDRA AND L. J. STOCKMEYEX. Alternation, in “Proceedings, 17th IEEE Symposium 
on Foundations of Comp. Sci., 98-108, October 1976. 
254 VAUGHAN R. PRATT 
4. S. A. COOK, Characterization of pushdown machines in terms of time bounded computers, 
J. Assoc. Comput. Mach. 18 (1971), 4-18. 
5. E. W. DIJKSTRA, “A Discipline of Programming,” Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1976. 
6. M. J. FISCHBR AND R. E. LADNER, Propositional modal logic of programs, in “Proceedings, 
9th Ann. ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, 286-294, Boulder, Colo., May 1977. 
7. M. J. FISCIIER AM) R. E. LADNER, Propositional dynamic logic of regular programs, manuscript, 
Dept. of Computor Science, University of Washington, 1977. 
8. D. GAEIBAY, Axiomatixations of logics of programs, manuscript, November 1977. 
9. G. GENTZEN, Untersuchungen i.iber das Logische Schliessen, Math. 2.39 (1934-1935), 176-210, 
405-431 (English tr.: Investigations into logical deduction, in “The Collected Papers of G. 
Gentzen,” pp. 69-131, 1969). 
10. K. J. J. HI~IKKA, Form and content in quantification theory, Acta Philos. Fenn. 8 (1955), 7-55. 
11. C. A. R. HOARE, An axiomatic basis for computer programming, Comm. ACM 12 (1969), 
576-580. 
12. M. JAZAYERI, W. F. OGDEN, AND W. C. ROUNDS, The intrinsically exponential complexity 
problem for attribute grammars, Comm. ACM 18 (1975), 697-706. 
13. D. Kom, On parallelism in Turing machines, in “Proceedings, 17th IEEE Symp. on Founda- 
tions of Comp. Sci..” 89-97, Oct. 1976. 
14. H. LEWIS, Complexity of solvable cases of the decision problem for the predicate calculus, in 
“Proceedings, 19th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,” Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, Oct., 1978. 
15. A. R. MEYW, “Equivalence of DL, DL+ and ADL for Regular Programs with Array Assign- 
ments,” Internal report, MIT, August 1977. 
16. J. MISRA, Prospects and limitations of automatic assertion generation for loop programs, SIAM 
J. Comput. 6 (1977), 718-729. 
17. R. PARIKH, A completeness result for PDL, in “Proceedings, Symp. on Mathematical Founda- 
tions of Computer Science,” Zakopane, Poland, Sept. 1978. 
18. V. R. PRATT, Semantical considerations on Floyd-Hoare logic, in “Proceedings, 17th Ann. 
IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Comp. Sci.,” 109-121, 1976. 
19. V. R. PRATT, A practical decision method for propositional dynamic logic, in “Proceedings, 
10th Ann. ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing,” 326-337, San Diego, Calif., May 1977. 
20. V. R. PRATT, Models of program logics, in “Proceedings, 20th IEEE Conference on Foundations 
of Computer Science,” San Juan, PR, Oct. 1979. 
21. K. SEGERBWG, A completeness theorem in the modal logic of programs, Preliminary report, 
Notices Amer. Math. Sot. 24 (1977), A-552. 
22. R. M. SMULLYAN, “First-Order Logic,” Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1968. 
23. R. M. SMULLYAN, Trees and nest structures, J. Symbolic Logic 31 (1966), 303-321. 
24. B. WEGBREIT, The synthesis of loop predicates, Comm. ACM 17 (1974), 102-l 12. 
25. K. WINKLMANN, “Equivalence of DL and DLf for Regular Programs,” Internal report, Lab. 
for Comp. Sci. MIT, 1978. 
